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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Andrew Charles Maxim appeals from the judgment of conviction issued after
Maxim entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled substance.
Maxim argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In July 2017, Andrew Charles Maxim was placed on probation. (State’s Ex. 1, p.2.)
In connection with his probation, he signed an Idaho Department of Correction Agreement
of Supervision. (State’s Ex. 2; see Tr., p.6, Ls.13-24.) The document Maxim signed states:
Search: I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal
property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by me, or for
which I am the controlling authority conducted by any agent of IDOC or a
law enforcement officer. I hereby waive my rights under the Fourth
Amendment and the Idaho constitution concerning searches.
(State’s Ex. 2, p.1.)

Above Maxim’s signature, the agreement reads: “I understand and

accept these conditions of supervision.”

(State’s Ex. 2, p.2.)

The agreement was

incorporated by reference into the terms of probation in the district court’s probation order.
(State’s Ex. 1, p.2.)
In early September 2017, Maxim moved in to his girlfriend’s apartment—
apartment 101 in the Foothills Apartments. (Tr., p.7, Ls.11-23.) On September 27, 2017,
the Meridian Police Department received a narcotics complaint regarding apartment 101
in the Foothills Apartments. (Tr., p.31, L.13 – p.32, L.9.) The individual who made the
complaint stated “that there w[ere] drugs being used and/or stolen from the residence and
that there were three small children that resided at that location as well.” (Id.) Officers
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Ludwig and Haustveit “responded to make contact with the homeowner and ask about the
welfare of the children.” (Id.)
When the officers pulled into the parking lot, a woman near the apartment complex
office waved them down. (Tr., p.32, L.13 – p.33, L.2.) She explained to the officers that
she had called in the complaint. (Id.) She had seen “some strange people hanging out at
the apartment that morning” and had heard from another tenant in the last day or two that
the female resident of the apartment “was in possession of a large quantity of heroin.” (Tr.,
p.33, Ls.11-25.) The woman was concerned because the female resident had three young
daughters who lived at the apartment, and she “just didn’t think it was a fit environment
for children.” (Tr., p.32, L.13 – p.33, L.2.)
The officers approached the apartment and Officer Ludwig knocked on the door.
(Tr., p.34, Ls.11-21.) No one responded. (Tr., p.34, Ls.15-21.) When Officer Ludwig
knocked louder, the door opened. (Id.) He could see “signs of children inside” such as
“toys and movies and things of that nature right in the living room.” (Tr., p.34, L.22 –
p.35, L.5.) Officer Ludwig announced “Meridian Police.” (Tr., p.35, L.10 – p.36, L.2.)
He then “heard what sounded like someone walking in a hurried pace away from the front
door.” (Id.) Officer Ludwig stepped inside of the apartment. (Id.)
Once inside the apartment, Officer Ludwig saw a woman walking toward the back
of the apartment. (Id.) “She turned towards [Officer Ludwig] when [he] stepped in and
voluntarily came out of the apartment.” (Id.) She told Officer Ludwig that it was not her
apartment. (Tr., p.36, Ls.5-15.) Officer Ludwig then went to “check the back bedroom.”
(Tr., p.36, Ls.16-24.) One of the doors in the hallway was locked. (Tr., p.37, Ls.14-22.)
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Officer Ludwig walked back to the front door to ask the woman whose room had the locked
door. (Tr., p.37, L.25 – p.38, L.14.) She responded that she did not know. (Id.)
“[A]t that point, [Officer Ludwig] could hear the latch of the door being triggered.”
(Id.) He turned around and saw an individual coming out of the previously-locked door.
(Id.) Officer Ludwig instructed the individual, subsequently identified as Andrew Charles
Maxim, to show his hands. (Tr., p.39, L.3 – p.42, L.18.) Officer Ludwig testified at the
suppression hearing that Maxim said, “‘This isn’t my house. It’s my girlfriend’s house.’”
(Tr., p.58, Ls.13-17.) Officer Ludwig asked Maxim if he had any needles, knives, guns,
or drugs. (Tr., p.40, L.5 – p.42, L.18.) Maxim said that he had a knife and started reaching
towards his pocket. (Id.) Officer Ludwig instructed Maxim to stop. (Id.) Officer Ludwig
stopped Maxim from grabbing his knife and “put [Maxim’s] hands on top of his head so
[Officer Ludwig] could control his movements more.” (Id.) Maxim tried to “pull[] away
from the officer and began walking towards the front door.” (R., p.66; see Defense Ex. A
at 02:15-02:32.)
Officer Ludwig “didn’t want to stick [his] hand in [Maxim’s pocket] out of fear that
the knife was in the open position,” so he “turned the inside pocket fabric inside out.” (Tr.,
p.40, L.5 – p.42, L.18.) Inside Maxim’s pocket were a knife and “a small multi colored
silicon container.” (Id.) Officer Ludwig opened the container and found heroin inside.
(Defense Ex. A at 03:35 – 03:41; see R., p.66.)
“The officers contacted the owner of the apartment by telephone.” (R., p.67.)
“[T]he owner stated she was not aware of Mr. Maxim being in the home.” (R., p.70.) She
also “agreed to let the police search her apartment and unlock her bathroom door.” (R.,
p.67.) “They unlocked the bathroom door and found a third person in the bathroom.” (Id.)
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Officer Ludwig testified at the suppression hearing that, “[f]or virtually all the
individuals [he] encounter[s], [he] will conduct a name and date of birth inquiry . . . that
will check . . . warrants.” (Tr., p.47, L.17 – p.48, L.9.) Consistent with Officer Ludwig’s
testimony, the officers ran a warrant check on Maxim and the other two individuals found
in the apartment. (Tr., p.48, Ls.10-16.) All three individuals in the apartment had—and
were arrested for—outstanding warrants. (Tr., p.48, Ls.17-21; Defense Ex. A at 1:30:301:31:32, 1:33:48-1:34:05, 1:37:18-1:37:40, 2:00:45-2:02:45.) Officer Ludwig testified that
he did not know that Maxim was on felony probation or that Maxim had signed an
agreement that included a search waiver. (Tr., p.39, Ls.12-17.)
The state charged Maxim with possession of a controlled substance. (R., p.23.)
Maxim moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the apartment. (R.,
pp.32-39.) In response, the state argued that (1) Maxim did not have standing to contest
the search in light of his Fourth Amendment waiver, (2) the officers conducted a reasonable
search as part of their community caretaking function, and (3) any violation of the Fourth
Amendment did not require suppression under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. (R.,
pp.43-50.) At the hearing, the district court found the standing issue in light of Maxim’s
waiver an “interesting one” but ultimately held that Maxim had standing because the
purpose of the exclusionary rule is “to change police officer behavior” and the officer did
not know that Maxim had signed the waiver. (Tr., p.26, L.5 – p.28, L.1.) At the end of the
hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement. (Tr., p.85, Ls.11-12.)
The district court subsequently issued a written decision on Maxim’s motion to
suppress. (R., pp.65-71.) The decision stated that “[i]t [was] not necessary to determine
whether the actual entry and pat down of Mr. Maxim were lawful” or “to analyze the
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effectiveness of Mr. Maxim’s waiver unknown to the officers at the time.” (R., p.70.)
Instead, the district court denied Maxim’s motion to suppress based on the doctrine of
inevitable discovery because the officers would have found the heroin even absent any
unlawful conduct. (R., p.70.)
Maxim pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance on the condition that he
could appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.73.) The district
court sentenced Maxim to an aggregate term of five years with two years fixed. (R., p.83.)
Maxim timely appealed. (R., pp.89-92.)

5

ISSUE
Maxim states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court’s speculative analysis under the inevitable
discovery doctrine is directly contrary to clear Idaho Supreme Court
precedent.
(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Maxim failed to show that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err By Denying Maxim’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Neither the search of the apartment nor the pat-down search of Maxim required

suppression of the drug evidence recovered from Maxim in the apartment. The search of
the apartment did not require suppression because Maxim did not have Fourth Amendment
standing to challenge the search. To challenge the search of the apartment, Maxim had to
show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. Maxim could not have
had a reasonable expectation of privacy from law enforcement officers searching his
apartment because, as part of his probation, he signed a supervision agreement in which he
“consent[ed] to the search of [his] . . . residence” and expressly “waive[d] [his] rights under
the Fourth Amendment . . . concerning searches.” (State’s Ex. No. 2, p.1.)
The pat-down search of Maxim did not require suppression for three reasons: First,
Maxim did not have standing to challenge the search because Maxim could not have had a
reasonable expectation of privacy from pat-down searches by law enforcement officers
given that he also “consent[ed] to the search of [his] person” in his supervision agreement.
(Id.) Second, the pat-down search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because
Officer Ludwig had reason to believe Maxim was armed and dangerous: Maxim admitted
that he had a knife, reached for his knife, and continually tried to pull away from Officer
Ludwig after Officer Ludwig stopped Maxim from grabbing his knife.

Third, the

exclusionary rule does not apply to the pat-down search because Maxim had an outstanding
arrest warrant and the officers inevitably would have found the heroin in a search incident
to his arrest. The officers ran a warrant check on each of the three individuals in the
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apartment, including the other two individuals who did not have heroin. This proves that,
even if Officer Ludwig had not found heroin on Maxim via a pat-down search, the officers
still would have run a warrant check, learned of his outstanding arrest warrant, arrested
Maxim, and found the heroin in a search incident to Maxim’s arrest. Thus, the exclusionary
rule does not apply.
B.

Standard Of Review
“When this Court reviews a district court’s order granting or denying a motion to

suppress evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Skurlock, 150 Idaho 404,
405, 247 P.3d 631, 632 (2011). “The Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous, but may freely review the trial court’s application of
constitutional principles in light of the facts found.” Id.
C.

The District Court Properly Denied Maxim’s Motion To Suppress Because The
Fourth Amendment Did Not Require Suppression Of The Heroin
On appeal, Maxim challenges the same two searches conducted by Officer Ludwig

that he challenged in the district court: the search of his girlfriend’s apartment and the patdown inside of the apartment. 1 (R., p.32 (moving to suppress “evidence obtained as the
result of an illegal, warrantless entry into the defendant’s residence and/or an illegal patdown”); Appellant’s brief, p.13 (arguing “the officers unlawfully entered and searched the

1

Maxim has not challenged the scope of the pat-down search or the search of the container
retrieved from Maxim and has thus waived those issues. See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez,
162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (“Issues not raised below will not be
considered by this court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which
the case was presented to the lower court.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted);
Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 669, 115 P.3d 756, 760 (2005) (explaining that issues
not raised in the opening brief are waived). Nor has Maxim asserted a violation of the
Idaho Constitution (R., pp.32-38), which means his challenge is limited to the Fourth
Amendment, see State v. Frederick, 149 Idaho 509, 513, 236 P.3d 1269, 1273 (2010).
8

apartment and . . . unlawfully searched Mr. Maxim’s person”).) Neither search required
the suppression of the heroin retrieved from Maxim’s person.
1.

The Search Of The Apartment Did Not Require Suppression Because
Maxim Did Not Have Standing To Challenge The Search

Maxim did not have Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search of the
apartment. 2 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. “However, even if a search is unreasonable, a defendant must have
a privacy interest that was invaded by the search in order to suppress evidence discovered
in the search.” State v. Mann, 162 Idaho 36, 41, 394 P.3d 79, 84 (2017). “When a search
is challenged, the defendant bears the burden of showing that he or she had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the place searched.” Id.; see State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 92,
625 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1981) (“[T]o claim the protection of the fourth amendment, a person
must show that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.”). This
concept is often referred to as Fourth Amendment standing. See Byrd v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018).
A defendant can satisfy his burden and claim Fourth Amendment standing only by
showing that he held a “subjective expectation of privacy . . . ‘that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.’” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990) (quoting Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978)); see State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 932-33,
188 P.3d 867, 874-75 (2008). The second part of that test focuses on whether “the

2

Although the district court resolved Maxim’s motion to suppress using the doctrine of
inevitable discovery (R., p.70), the state made a Fourth Amendment standing argument in
the district court (R., pp.45-46), and “this Court will affirm upon the correct theory,”
Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 275-76, 396 P.3d 704-05. In any event, the state can raise
Fourth Amendment standing for the first time on appeal. See State v. Hanson, 142 Idaho
711, 717-18, 132 P.3d 468, 474-75 (Ct. App. 2006).
9

individual’s expectation, viewed objectively, is ‘justifiable’ under the circumstances.”
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 353 (1967)).
The “circumstances” here included Maxim’s status as a probationer. “Inherent in
the very nature of probation is that probationers ‘do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled.’” United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (quoting
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987)). “Just as other punishments for criminal
convictions curtail an offender’s freedoms, a court granting probation may impose
reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding
citizens.” Id.
The “circumstances” here also included Maxim’s signed Fourth Amendment
waiver in his supervision agreement for felony probation. “While the United States
Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a probationer may waive his Fourth
Amendment rights through acceptance of probationary search conditions, this Court has
determined that a probationer’s consent to searches constitutes a waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208, 207 P.3d 182, 184 (2009)
(footnote omitted); cf. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006) (“[A] condition of
release can so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy
that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth
Amendment.”). “[T]he scope of [a] waiver is defined by the terms employed in the
condition of probation.” State v. Jaskowski, 163 Idaho 257, 261, 409 P.3d 837, 841 (2018);
see State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987).
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For example, in Gawron, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Gawron could not
claim a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights from a warrantless search of his house
because his probation agreement “expressly waived his constitutional right to be free from
warrantless searches.” 112 Idaho at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297. Gawron’s term of probation
read: “That probationer does hereby agree and consent to the search of his person,
automobile, real property, and any other property at any time and at any place by any law
enforcement officer, peace officer, or probation officer, and does waive his constitutional
right to be free from such searches.” Id. at 842, 736 P.2d at 1296. Given the language of
Gawron’s probation term, the court found no need to apply the traditional reasonableness
analysis for probation searches. Id. at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297; see Purdum, 147 Idaho at
209, 207 P.3d at 185 (explaining that, in Gawron, the “reasonableness test . . . did not apply
because the probationer had ‘expressly waived his constitutional right to be free from
warrantless searches’”). Instead, the court affirmed the denial of Gawron’s motion to
suppress because “Gawron simply waived all Fourth Amendment rights relating to
searches of his person or property.” Jaskowski, 163 Idaho at 261, 409 P.3d at 841.
Similarly, in State v. Spencer, 139 Idaho 736, 85 P.3d 1135 (Ct. App. 2004), the
court held that an individual cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a location
the individual knows the police can freely search at any time pursuant to a condition of
probation. Id. at 739, 85 P.3d at 1138. Spencer moved in to his sister’s house knowing
that she had signed a consent to search her home upon being placed on probation. Id. The
court held “that Spencer’s expectation of privacy was neither legitimate nor reasonable”
because he was “fully aware that the house was subject to a search at any time.” Id.
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Under Gawron and Spencer, Maxim could not have had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the apartment. Not only was Maxim, like Spencer, fully aware that his
residence was “subject to a search at any time,” id., it was his consent and waiver that
opened his residence to the police. 3 Just like Gawron, Maxim “expressly waived his
constitutional right to be free from warrantless searches.” 112 Idaho at 843, 736 P.2d at
1297. His signed agreement of supervision stated: “I hereby waive my rights under the
Fourth Amendment . . . concerning searches.” (State’s Ex. 2, p.1.) He also expressly
“consent[ed] to the search of . . . [his] residence . . . conducted by any agent of IDOC or a
law enforcement officer.” (Id.)
Given these circumstances, any subjective expectation of privacy Maxim had in the
apartment was not “justifiable” when “viewed objectively.” Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
Assuming Maxim subjectively maintained an expectation of privacy in his residence even
after signing his supervision agreement, society is not prepared to recognize such an
unrealistic privacy expectation as reasonable. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 (finding
parolee with a parole search condition “did not have an expectation of privacy that society
would recognize as legitimate”); see Spencer, 139 Idaho at 739, 85 P.3d at 1138. Maxim
cannot sign an agreement “waiv[ing] [his] rights under the Fourth Amendment . . .
concerning searches” and expressly “consent[ing] to the search of [his] . . . residence” and
still reasonably expect privacy from law enforcement officers searching his residence. See
Gawron, 112 Idaho at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297; Spencer, 139 Idaho at 739, 85 P.3d at 1138.

3

As a co-resident with his girlfriend, Maxim could, at the very least, consent to a search
of the common areas within the apartment, see Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 298307 (2014), which is where Officer Ludwig found Maxim (Defense Ex. A at 1:55-2:00).
12

Because Maxim did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment, he did
not have Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search.
Maxim did not argue to the district court, and has not argued on appeal, that the
search of the apartment fell outside the scope of his signed waiver—and with good reason.
Both Officers Ludwig and Haustveit qualify as “law enforcement officer[s]” under any
plain meaning of the phrase, and Maxim testified at the suppression hearing that the
apartment was his “residence” at the time of the search. (State’s Ex. 2, p.1; see Tr., p.13,
L.10 – p.14, L.16.) The search thus fell within the scope of the signed supervision
agreement. See Jaskowski, 163 Idaho at 261, 409 P.3d at 841 (treating a probation
agreement like a contract and observing that “the court will give force and effect to the
words of the contract”). Moreover, like the defendant in Gawron, Maxim “has made no
allegation that his signature and acceptance of the . . . conditions of probation were
involuntary or done unintelligently.” 112 Idaho at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297.
The district court found “the officer’s lack of knowledge” of the supervision
agreement meant Maxim’s Fourth Amendment waiver could not affect the Fourth
Amendment standing analysis. (Tr., p.26, L.5 – p.28, L.1.) The district court cited no
authority for limiting the standing analysis to the facts within the officer’s knowledge, and
its novel limitation contradicts decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court and Idaho’s
appellate courts. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718-19 (1987); State v.
Vasquez, 129 Idaho 129, 132, 922 P.2d 426, 429 (Ct. App. 1996).
For example, in O’Connor, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the fact that “the only
items found by the investigators were apparently personal items” to hold that a state
employee had “a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets” 480 U.S.
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at 718-19. Such evidence would have been out of bounds under the district court’s novel
approach because the investigators could not have known at the time of the search that the
fruits of that search would consist of “only . . . personal items.” Id.
Similarly, in Vasquez, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that the defendant did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a house searched by police because he was “a
casual visitor.” 129 Idaho at 132, 922 P.2d at 429. The officers who conducted the search
could not have known the defendant’s status as a casual house guest at the time of the
search, however, because the defendant “entered the apartment about five minutes before
the police arrived.” Id. at 130, 922 P.2d at 427.
Third and fourth examples come from the line of cases addressing whether a
defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car. In Mann, the Idaho
Supreme Court held the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation in the rental car
he was driving because he was not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement—
a fact the searching officer, who never saw the rental agreement, could not have known.
162 Idaho at 42, 394 P.3d at 85. Subsequently, in a different case, the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the test adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court but not on the basis that a reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis is limited to facts within the officer’s knowledge. Byrd,
138 S. Ct. at 1529. On the contrary, the Court remanded the case for “further factual
development” to determine whether the defendant effectively stole the car by “intentionally
us[ing] a third party strawman in a calculated plan to mislead the rental company from the
very outset”—a scheme that the officer who pulled the defendant over for “a possible traffic
infraction” would not have known about but that could have dealt a fatal blow to the
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car. Id. at 1529-30; see also

14

United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 835, 839 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant did
not have Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search of a laptop computer because,
“[a]fter the execution of the . . . warrant, Sergeant Carmichael discovered that the laptop
. . . [was] stolen property”) (emphasis added).
The district court’s novel limitation to information within the officer’s knowledge
at the time of the search not only contradicts decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court and
Idaho’s appellate courts, it actually contradicts its own analysis in this case. The district
court found Maxim had standing to challenge the search of the apartment because of “his
duration of living there.” (Tr., p.26, Ls.13-18.) But the only evidence showing Maxim’s
“duration of living there” was Maxim’s own testimony that he had lived in the apartment,
“[g]ive or take, three and a half weeks.” (Tr., p.7, Ls.21-23.) Nothing in the record
suggests Officer Ludwig knew that Maxim had been living in the apartment for three and
a half weeks at the time of the search. In fact, Officer Ludwig testified that he did not even
know who Maxim was prior to the search (Tr., p.39, Ls.10-14), and Maxim testified that
he failed to inform his probation officer that he lived at the apartment even though his
supervision agreement required such disclosures (Tr., p.14, Ls.10-16; see State’s Ex. 2,
p.1). Because the U.S. Supreme Court and Idaho’s appellate courts have made clear that
Fourth Amendment standing is not conditioned on the officer’s knowledge at the time of
the search, the district court should have considered Maxim’s Fourth Amendment waiver
as part of its Fourth Amendment standing analysis. 4

4

The issue of whether a searching officer must know about a Fourth Amendment waiver
in order for the waiver to affect the Fourth Amendment analysis is currently pending before
the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Saldivar, No. 46098, which is scheduled for oral
argument on April 12, 2019.
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The district court also claimed the purpose of the exclusionary rule “to curb
officers’ behavior” somehow supported its finding that Maxim had standing. (Tr., p.26,
L.5 – p.28, L.1.) That is backwards: the exclusionary rule only enters the picture if the
defendant has standing and successfully challenges the search; it does not put a thumb on
the scale throughout the standing analysis. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85
(1980) (“[D]efendants . . . may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own
Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated.”).
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, regardless of the exclusionary
rule and its purpose, a defendant must have Fourth Amendment standing to challenge an
allegedly illegal search. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138 & n.6 (1978) (refusing to
expand exclusionary rule’s protection to those who do not actually have Fourth
Amendment standing and citing two cases in which it had already rejected the same
argument). As the Court explained in rejecting an argument similar to the district court’s,
“[e]ach time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substantial social cost for the
vindication of Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. at 137. “Relevant and reliable evidence is
kept from the trier of fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected.” Id. Thus, “it is
proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to
benefit from the [exclusionary] rule’s protections.” Id. at 134.
In sum, Maxim signed an agreement stating that he waived his Fourth Amendment
rights concerning searches and consented to law enforcement officers searching his
residence. (State’s Ex. 2, p.1.) Having done so, he could not have had a reasonable
expectation of privacy from law enforcement officers searching his residence and thus
lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search of the apartment.
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2.

The Pat-down Search Did Not Require Suppression Because Maxim Did
Not Have Standing To Challenge The Search, The Search Was Reasonable,
And The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Applied

The district court properly rejected Maxim’s challenge to Officer Ludwig’s patdown search inside of the apartment. The pat-down search did not require suppression for
at least three reasons:
First, Maxim did not have Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the pat-down
search for the same reasons he did not have standing to challenge the search of the
apartment. See Part C.1. By signing the supervision agreement, Maxim “waive[d] [his]
rights under the Fourth Amendment . . . concerning searches” and expressly “consent[ed]
to the search of [his] person.” (State’s Ex. 2, p.1.) The pat-down search was indisputably
a “search of [his] person.” (Id.) Having signed an agreement in which he gave up his
Fourth Amendment rights and consented to a search of his person, Maxim could not have
reasonably expected privacy from pat-down searches conducted by law enforcement
officers. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 (finding parolee with a parole search condition “did
not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate”).
Second, the pat-down search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 5 An
officer can conduct a pat-down search “when, at the moment of the frisk, the officer has
reason to believe that the individual he or she is investigating is ‘armed and presently
dangerous to the officer or others.’” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 818, 203 P.3d 1203,
1217 (2009) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968)). Factors that “influence
whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would conclude that a particular
person was armed and dangerous” include “whether there were any bulges in the suspect’s
5

The state asserted this argument in the district court. (R., p.48; Tr., p.76, L.13 – p.78,
L.14.)
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clothing that resembled a weapon; whether the encounter took place late at night or in a
high crime area; and whether the individual made threatening or furtive movements,
indicated that he or she possessed a weapon, appeared nervous or agitated, appeared to be
under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, was unwilling to cooperate, or had a
reputation for being dangerous.” Id. at 819, 203 P.3d at 1218. “Whether any of these
considerations, taken together or by themselves, are enough to justify a Terry frisk depends
on an analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
For example, in State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 989 P.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1999), an
officer entered a residence and observed a large knife on boxes near the door and a knife
sheath on the defendant’s belt. Id. at 556, 989 P.2d at 788. The officer identified himself
and explained to the defendant that he had to take the knife from the sheath for officer
safety. Id. The defendant “became very uncooperative.” Id. Given those circumstances,
the Idaho Court of Appeals held a pat-down search was reasonable because the officer
“possessed articulable facts that justified him in suspecting that [the defendant] was armed
and presently dangerous.” Id.
Here, Officer Ludwig possessed even more articulable facts that justified him
suspecting that Maxim was armed and presently dangerous than the officer in Fleenor. The
officer in Fleenor had reason to believe the defendant had a knife because he saw a knife
sheath on the defendant’s belt. Id. Officer Ludwig had reason to believe Maxim had a
knife because Maxim told Officer Ludwig “that he had a knife.” (Tr., p.41, Ls.3-11.) The
only other fact the officer in Fleenor had justifying his pat-down search was that the
defendant “became very uncooperative” and “attempted to walk away.” Id. at 554, 556,
989 P.2d at 786, 788. Maxim, too, “did not cooperate” but in a manner that posed a much
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greater risk to Officer Ludwig. (R., p.66.) Immediately after telling Officer Ludwig that
he had a knife in his pocket, Maxim reached for his pocket, and according to Officer
Ludwig’s testimony, “it was clear that [Maxim] was trying to access that knife.” (Tr., p.41,
Ls.7-11, p.43, L.5 – p.44, L.7.) Maxim “also pulled away from the officer and began
walking towards the front door.” (R., p.66.) Officer Ludwig stopped Maxim from
grabbing his knife and “put his hands on top of his head so [Officer Ludwig] could control
his movements more.” (Tr., p.41, Ls.12-18.) As Officer Ludwig and Maxim relocated
down the hall “where there was a little bit more space,” Maxim “continued to try to pull
away from [Officer Ludwig].” (Tr., p.41, L.12 – p.42, L.1; see Defense Ex. A at 2:082:33.) It was at that moment, after Maxim had told Officer Ludwig that he had a knife,
after Maxim had reached for his knife, and after Maxim had repeatedly tried to pull away
from Officer Ludwig, that Officer Ludwig conducted a pat-down search. Even more so
than the officer in Fleenor, Officer Ludwig “possessed articulable facts that justified him
in suspecting that [Maxim] was armed and presently dangerous.” 133 Idaho at 556, 989
P.2d at 788.
In the district court, Maxim argued that this case is indistinguishable from State v.
Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 152 P.3d 16 (2007). (R., pp.36-37.) He was mistaken. In Henage,
an officer conducted a pat-down search of a defendant who admitted he had a knife. 143
Idaho at 661, 152 P.3d at 22. The defendant “was not in any way acting threatening or
dangerous, but indeed, according to [the officer’s] testimony, was ‘cooperative’ and
‘polite.’” Id. The officer had known the defendant for several years and testified the
defendant “had ‘always been cooperative and polite’ with him and that he had ‘never had
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a problem with him.’” Id. Based on those circumstances, the Idaho Supreme Court found
the officer’s pat-down search violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 662, 152 P.3d at 23.
The only similarity between the circumstances here and the circumstance in Henage
is that the Henage defendant and Maxim both admitted to having a knife. Aside from that,
the cases are polar opposites: The defendant in Henage “was ‘cooperative’ and ‘polite.’”
143 Idaho at 661, 152 P.3d at 22. Maxim “continued to try to pull away from [Officer
Ludwig].” (Tr., p.42, L.1; see Defense Ex. A at 2:08-2:33.) The defendant in Henage
“made no suspicious movements for his pockets or other area from which a weapon might
be readily retrieved.” 143 Idaho at 662, 152 P.3d at 23. Maxim “put[] his hands down
towards his pants where the knife was” in a manner that made it “clear that he was trying
to access that knife.” (Tr., p.43, L.5 – p.44, L.7.) The officer in Henage testified that “[h]e
had known [the defendant] for several years and never had a combative experience with
him” and that the defendant “had ‘always been cooperative and polite’ with him and that
he had ‘never had a problem with him.’” 143 Idaho at 661, 152 P.3d at 22. Officer Ludwig
had no history with Maxim to work from. (Tr., p.39, Ls.3-11.) Moreover, Officer Ludwig
testified that Maxim’s behavior was suspect from the beginning—specifically, Maxim hid
in the locked bathroom even after the police announced themselves and then, after coming
out of the bathroom, tried to “walk right past [Officer Ludwig] after closing the door.” (Tr.,
p.43, L.5 – p.44, L.7.) In short, the very facts that the Idaho Supreme Court said were
missing in Henage for the officer to conduct a permissible pat-down search were present
here.
Third, as the district court found, the exclusionary rule does not apply to the patdown search because the officers would have inevitably discovered the heroin. (R., pp.69-
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70.) Under the doctrine of inevitable discovery, the exclusionary rule does not apply to
evidence initially discovered unlawfully if it inevitably would have been discovered by
lawful means. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495-97, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283-85 (2001).
“[T]he inquiry should concentrate upon the inevitability of the discovery rather than the
independence of the investigation.” State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 102, 57 P.3d 807,
813 (Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis in original). Thus, “a wholly independent investigation,
while certainly relevant to whether discovery was inevitable, is not a prerequisite to
application of the inevitable discovery exception.” Id.
The doctrine of inevitable discovery applies to the pat-down search because Officer
Ludwig inevitably would have arrested Maxim based on his outstanding warrant and found
the heroin in a search incident to that arrest. Maxim does not dispute that he had a warrant
out for his arrest at the time of the pat-down search. (Tr., p.15, L.25 – p.16, L.2.) And
Officer Ludwig testified that “as part of [his] normal law enforcement duties in a situation
like this” he “conduct[s] a name and date of birth inquiry” for “virtually all the individuals
[he] encounter[s]” to “check to see if they have any wants, warrants, or alerts.” (Tr., p.47,
L.17 – p.48, L.9.) In fact, he ran warrant checks on all of the individuals found in the
apartment even though he did not find heroin on any of them except Maxim. (Tr., p.48,
Ls.10-16.) Thus, even without the pat-down search, Officer Ludwig would have run a
warrant check on Maxim, and that warrant check indisputably would have indicated that
Maxim “was currently wanted on an outstanding failure to appear warrant.” (Tr., p.48,
Ls.17-21.) At that point, Officer Ludwig would have been “compelled to arrest [Maxim]
and bring [him] before the nearest magistrate.” (Tr., p.48, Ls.22-25); see Utah v. Strieff,
136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062 (2016) (“[O]nce [the officer] discovered the warrant, he had an
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obligation to arrest [the defendant].”).

And Officer Ludwig inevitably would have

conducted a search incident to that arrest because “[t]here is always a search of the person
incident to their arrest.” (Tr., p.49, Ls.1-8 (emphasis added)); see Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at
2062 (“And once [the officer] was authorized to arrest [the defendant], it was undisputedly
lawful to search [the defendant] as an incident of his arrest to protect [the officer]’s
safety.”). Because that inevitable search incident to Maxim’s arrest would have produced
the heroin, see State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656, 658, 759 P.2d 947, 949 (Ct. App. 1988) (“A
search incident to arrest includes containers within the arrestee’s immediate control.”), the
exclusionary rule does not apply to the pat-down search.
Maxim argues “there is no assurance that the officers would have actually run Mr.
Maxim’s information.” (Appellant’s brief, p.16.) That is wrong. In addition to running a
warrant check on Maxim, the officers ran warrant checks on the only other two individuals
found in the house with Maxim—even though neither of them had heroin. (Tr., p.48,
Ls.10-16.) Both of the other individuals had warrants, and both of the other individuals
were arrested. 6 Put differently, this is not an alternate timeline in which the district court
“substitute[ed] what the police should have done for what they really did or were doing.”
State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 787, 352 P.3d 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis in
original). Running warrant checks on the individuals in the apartment was precisely “what
they . . . were doing.” Id. (emphasis added).

6

The officers arrested the female individual for outstanding warrants and giving false
information to a police officer based on information the officers gathered from the warrant
check. (Defense Ex. A at 2:00:45-2:02:45.) The officers arrested the male individual
because a warrant check showed outstanding warrants. (Defense Ex. A at 1:30:30-1:31:32,
1:33:48-1:34:05, 1:37:18-1:37:40.)
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And, even setting aside Officer Ludwig’s routine practice of running warrant
checks, the officers had good reason to run warrant checks on the individuals in the
apartment, including Maxim. The first individual they encountered in the apartment
admitted that it was not her apartment. (Tr., p.36, Ls.5-15.) Although there was an
unresolved factual dispute over whether Maxim told Officer Ludwig that it “was” or
“wasn’t” his apartment (see R., p.66), “[w]hen the owner was finally contacted, the owner
stated she was not aware of Mr. Maxim being in the home” (R., p.70). Because Officer
Ludwig has a practice of running warrant checks on individuals he encounters and because
the apartment owner told him she did not know people were in her home (see Defense Ex.
A at 33:15-33:22 (“How many people should be in your house right now? Zero.”)), he
inevitably would have run a warrant check on Maxim even if he had not first found heroin
in Maxim’s possession. That check would have led Officer Ludwig to the heroin on
Maxim, and the exclusionary rule thus does not apply to the pat-down search.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of conviction issued
after Maxim entered a conditional guilty plea to felony possession of a controlled
substance.
DATED this 7th day of March, 2019.
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Deputy Attorney General
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